11 December 2007

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Delegates,

The members of Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom in 35 countries are pleased to see the States Parties of the Bioweapons Convention proceeding in their work despite the failure to approve and implement the inspection protocol in 2001.   We do welcome the small step forward in establishing the implementation support unit at the 2006 Review Conference.

This year as delegates consider the development and enforcement of national laws to bring States Parties into full compliance with all articles of the Bioweapons Convention, imaginative and forward looking proposals that can help more nations bring their own laws into compliance with the treaty are needed. Also needed is a solid foundations for a future effective protocol on monitoring and inspection.

We continue to be concerned about the dangers of secret bioweapons development even in countries which have laws consistent with the treaty.  Last year civil society organizations, including our own, brought concerns about bioweapons research that, while purportedly for defensive purposes, had aspects that suggested preparation for offensive use in violation of the treaty. WILPF’s U.S. Section submitted a paper on the efforts of Boston citizens to oppose a new BSL-4 Lab intended for research of incurable and always fatal diseases. Many citizens and scientists predict that such research will not only endanger the community, but also be used for offensive as well as defensive purposes. NGOs have reported that between 2002 and 2004 at least $44 billion had been allocated for such research in both U.S. civilian (often university) laboratories and the military laboratories into which that research feeds.

In closed societies, citizens have few options to expose or protest questionable activities. Even in relatively open societies it is often difficult to obtain a hearing from government. Fortunately this year we can report that U.S. Congressional hearings have finally been held, but many troubling questions remain.

To what body can civil society organizations report suspected violations of the treaty? Where are the international or regional watch-dogs that can help ensure implementation? Supposedly the Secretary General’s Office and the Security Council are the two international bodies that can currently receive reports of treaty violations.  Can civil society organizations submit evidence to these bodies? Might the Implementation Support Unit be a possible recipient of such reports from watch-dog NGOs? Some such process, similar to the shadow reports NGOs can submit when their governments report on human rights treaty compliance, might help move States Parties toward full compliance, and away from dangerous and illegal indulgence in research and development for offensive purposes.

In order to protect the planet from a biological arms race and the threat of biological attacks, the BTWC must be universal. WILPF calls on the BTWC to work towards universalization—both quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitative efforts should target those States who remain outside the Convention while qualitative efforts should focus on improving national implementation.

National implementation is critical to the effectiveness of the Convention. WILPF calls on States Parties to strengthen national legislation and reminds States Parties that implementing some of the provisions of the BTWC require similar steps as implementing obligations under SC Resolution 1540.

Lastly, verification mechanisms and an inspection process are essential elements missing in the BTWC framework. Excellent work in preparing the legal and technical framework in this regard has been done, and cannot be lost.  There is still work to do, and the ripe political moment to achieve an inspection and verification regime is approaching.  WILPF calls on States Parties to reconsider these important issues at the 7th Review Conference in 2011.

Thank you.

 Delivered by Susi Snyder, Secretary General - WILPF